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The U.S. practice of targeted killing by remotely-piloted 
unmanned vehicles1 in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Iraq and 
Somalia—popularly referred to as “America’s drone wars”2—raises the 
question of the application of humanitarian law principles to the 
conduct of America’s longest-running war. Yet, it not only presents 
complex issues of international law but difficult moral and ethical 
questions. Administration officials and some academics and 
commentators have praised targeted killing as effective and lawful. 
Others have criticized it as immoral, illegal, and unproductive. This 
article concludes that conducting targeted killing operations outside 
areas of active hostilities violates international law. In addition, even 
in areas in which targeted killings may be lawful, particular uses of 
drones may violate international humanitarian law if insufficient 
attention is paid to principles of proportionality and distinction in 
∗ Leila Nadya Sadat, Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law and Director 
of the Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, Washington University 
in St. Louis. A version of this speech was first delivered on August 27, 
2012 on the occasion of the Sixth Annual International Humanitarian 
Law Dialogs in Chautauqua, New York. Thanks to Jing Geng and John 
Grothaus for research assistance.  
1. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119 
.htm.   
2. David Rhode, The Drone War, REUTERS, Jan. 26, 2012, http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-davos-reutersmagazine-dronewar-
idUSTRE80P19R20120126.  
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their use, particularly as regards decisions of whom, how, and when to 
target an individual for death. Moreover, to the extent that drones 
become a means to terrorize a civilian population, their use may be 
prohibited by international humanitarian law. Finally, decision-
makers in the United States must engage not only with the question 
whether their use of targeted killing is legal, but is a policy that 
resonates with America’s deepest values and promotes U.S. long term 
interests, including its interest in international peace and justice.3  
I. Introduction 
In November 2008, the Taliban captured New York Times 
journalist David Rhode, along with two Afghan colleagues, and held 
them for seven months in North and South Waziristan, the focus of 
the American drone campaign at the time. Rhode was lucky enough 
to escape from his captors and penned a series of gripping articles 
about his captivity that appeared on the front pages of the New York 
Times in 2009.4 His articles recount an astonishing tale of his capture, 
the death threats he endured, and the hardships he faced; but what is 
perhaps even more extraordinary are his insights into the minds of his 
Taliban captors. In particular, because he was being held in an area 
being patrolled by drones and in which drone strikes were taking 
place with regularity, he wrote about the experience of being on the 
ground while U.S. drones circled overhead. He recently summarized 
this experience in Reuters, observing: 
Throughout our captivity, American drones were a frequent 
presence in the skies above North and South Waziristan. 
3. A full treatment of this question is beyond the scope of this short essay, 
which admittedly raises more questions than answers. For other writings 
see David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-
Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defense?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 171 (2005); Georg Nolte, Preventive Use of Force and Preventive 
Killings: Moves into a Different Legal Order, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 
111 (2004); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Seductive Drones: Learning from a 
Decade of Lethal Operations, J.L. INFO. & SCI., Aug. 2011, at 116; 
Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and 
International Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 
30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 595 (2012); Mark V. Vlasic, Assassination & Targeted 
Killing—A Historical and Post-Bin Laden Legal Analysis, 43 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 259 (2012).  
4. David Rhode, A Rope and a Prayer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at A1; 
David Rhode, A Drone Strike and Dwindling Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
21, 2009, at A1; David Rhode, ‘You Have Atomic Bombs, but We Have 
Suicide Bombers,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009, at A1; David Rhode, 
Inside the Islamic Emirate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at A1; David 
Rhode, 7 Months, 10 Days in Captivity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, at 
A1. 
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Unmanned, propeller driven aircraft, they sounded like a small 
plane—a Piper Cub or Cessna—circling overhead. Dark specks 
in a blue sky, they could be spotted and tracked with the naked 
eye. Our guards studied their flight patterns for indications of 
when they might strike. . . .  
The drones were terrifying. From the ground, it is impossible to 
determine who or what they are tracking as they circle 
overhead. The buzz of a distant propeller is a constant reminder 
of imminent death. Drones fire missiles that travel faster than 
the speed of sound. A drone’s victim never hears the missile 
that kills him.5 
Rhode was almost beheaded by his captors after a drone strike 
took place near his prison, inflaming his captors.6 In his writings, he 
admits that the drone strikes clearly disrupted Taliban operations and 
seemed to be tactically effective. At the same time, he observes, as 
have others, that the strategic value of U.S. drone strikes may be 
problematic, as they have also resulted in tremendous hatred of and 
anger with the United States and increased support for the militants.   
Though only recently acknowledged by U.S. government officials, 
attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles (commonly called “drones”) have 
become a major part of U.S. military strategy and counterterrorism 
operations. The drones include the MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 
Reaper.7 The Predator is more commonly used and is an “armed, 
multi-mission, medium-altitude, long endurance remotely piloted 
aircraft,” with a “unique capability to autonomously execute the kill 
chain (find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess) against high value, 
fleeting, and time sensitive targets,” according to U.S. Air Force 
reports.8 Predator drones are fitted with two video cameras, an 
infrared sensor, a laser system, and two laser-guided Hellfire missiles, 
which the Air Force describes as having “highly accurate, low 
collateral damage, and anti-armor and anti-personnel engagement 
capability.”9 Besides a small on-site crew that handles the Predator’s 
takeoff and landing, the Predator is controlled remotely by a crew 
based in the United States.10 
5. Rhode, supra note 2. 
6. Id.  
7. MQ-1B Predator, U.S. AIR FORCE (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.af.mil/ 
information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=122; MQ-9 Reaper, U.S. AIR 
FORCE (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factshe 
et.asp?id=6405. 
8. MQ-1B Predator, supra note 7.  
9. Id. 
10. Id. The Reaper is also an “armed, multi-mission, medium-altitude, long 
endurance remotely piloted aircraft,” but is primarily a “hunter/killer” 
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II. The Obama Administration “Lawyers Up” 
In 2009, Jane Mayer reported in The New Yorker on a drone 
strike that had taken place in Pakistan and discussed both the CIA’s 
highly classified program of drone strikes in Pakistan and other 
countries around the world, as well as the open use of drones by U.S. 
military forces operating in theatres of war in Afghanistan and Iraq.11 
The story generated a great deal of criticism of U.S. policy and, just 
as lawyers were asked to justify Bush Administration Policies on 
detention after the 9/11 attacks, Obama Administration lawyers were 
asked to do the same for the drone program.  
In March of 2010, the Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of 
State, Harold Hongju Koh, gave a much-anticipated speech at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in 
which he defended the Obama Administration’s increasing use of 
drones against individuals alleged to be members of al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, or “associated forces.”12 The speech emphasized the desire of 
the United States to comply with international humanitarian law, and 
specifically, the principles of distinction and proportionality. Koh 
argued that, as a matter of law, the right of the United States to kill 
suspected terrorists and militants was predicated upon the existence 
of an armed conflict between it and various individuals and 
organizations that allowed the United States to use “self-defense” 
against these individuals and organizations.13 The speech was 
controversial. Although Obama had promised to pursue terrorists and 
“finish” the war in Afghanistan during the presidential campaign, 
many human rights activists did not expect his administration to 
cleave to the same legal arguments about the “war on terror” that his 
predecessor had, and were surprised that he had done so. Dean Koh’s 
speech responded to very few of the difficult legal and moral questions 
raised by targeted killing, and although he never used the Bush 
Administration term of “unlawful enemy combatant” to describe 
those targeted, the speech seemed more in line with past 
administration policies than a departure from them.  
Subsequently, the drone campaign intensified, and additional 
strikes took place in more countries and, occasionally, against not 
only foreigners but United States citizens. Because the program has 
and only collects intelligence secondarily. As such, it is both larger and 
carries more power than the Predator, and can use additional weapons 
and carry up to four Hellfire missiles. MQ-9 Reaper, supra note 7.  
11. Jane Mayer, The Predators of War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact 
 _mayer.  
12. Koh, supra note 1.  
13. Id. 
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largely been operated by the CIA and classified as secret, accurate 
quantitative assessments of the number of strikes, the locations of the 
strikes, the number of persons killed, and the identities of those killed 
or injured is very difficult to come by. Nonetheless, based upon 
information available in the public domain, it has been estimated that 
during his eight years in office, President George W. Bush authorized 
forty-four strikes in Pakistan.14 Conversely, in less than four years, it 
has been reported that President Obama authorized 294 strikes in 
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia as of May 28, 2012, in addition to 
strikes in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq.15 In Pakistan alone, it has 
been reported that these strikes resulted in between 2,524–3,247 
casualties, including 482–852 civilians, and an additional 1,204–1,330 
injured.16 Other sources suggest that the number of civilian casualties 
may be considerably lower,17 and the Pakistani government suggests 
that the civilian casualties have been much higher.18 Regardless of the 
precise number of casualties, there seems little doubt that thousands 
of human beings have been killed by drone strikes, and thousands 
more injured, most outside the theatre of active hostilities.  
In 2011, a fifty-page memorandum drafted by David Barron and 
Martin Lederman, attorneys in the Department of Justice’s Office of 
Legal Counsel, and signed by Barron authorized the targeting killing 
of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen. This memo has not been 
made public; however, its contents were described by anonymous 
14. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington’s Phantom War: 
The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan, FOREIGN AFF., 
July—Aug. 2011, at 12, 12. 
15. Striking Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes. 
com/interactive/2012/05/29/world/middleeast/striking-al-qaeda.html.  
16. Obama 2012 Pakistan Strikes, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE 
JOURNALISM, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/01/11/obama 
-2012-strikes (last updated Dec. 28, 2012). The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism is a London-based nonprofit journalism organization that 
collaborates with media outlets such as the BBC, Financial Times, 
Daily Telegraph, and Le Monde. About the Bureau, THE BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/  
who (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). See also STANFORD INT’L HUM. RTS. & 
CONFLICT RES. CLINIC & NYU GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC, LIVING UNDER 
DRONES: DEATH, INJURY AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE 
PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN (2012) [hereinafter LIVING UNDER DRONES] 
(concluding that there is significant evidence that U.S. drone strikes 
have injured and killed civilians). 
17. The Long War Journal, a U.S.-based nonprofit media organization has 
reported 2,354 militant casualties and 138 civilian deaths in Pakistan 
since 2006. About the Long War Journal, THE LONG WAR JOURNAL, 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/about.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
18. Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 14, at 13 (according to Pakistani 
government officials, 700 civilians were killed in 2009 alone).  
219 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
America’s Drone Wars 
sources to journalist Charlie Savage and published in the New York 
Times.19 
According to Savage’s sources, the memo authorized the killing of 
al-Awlaki only if it was not feasible to capture him.20 Such a killing 
was justified because al-Awlaki “was taking part in the war between 
the United States and Al Qaeda and posed a significant threat to 
Americans.”21 The memorandum argued that killing al-Awlaki was 
not an assassination, as he was a lawful target in an armed conflict, 
and wasn’t murder since he was a lawful target in an armed conflict. 
Further, it concluded that the drone’s pilot, as a CIA official, would 
not be committing a war crime even though he or she was not a 
uniformed soldier.22 Finally, relying on precedent allowing American 
citizens to be prosecuted in a military court if they had joined an 
enemy’s military, the memorandum apparently states that the process 
due to al-Awlaki was “due process in war,”23 not the protections of 
the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, if killing or capturing al-Awlaki 
was justifiable to avoid imminent attack, then his targeted killing 
abroad was legal.24 
On March 5, 2012, another prominent government lawyer, 
Attorney General Eric Holder, also went public to justify the targeted 
killing of foreigners and U.S. citizens by the government.25 Holder’s 
speech laid out the procedures used by the president in determining 
19. Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A1. According to the article, the Obama 
Administration refused to acknowledge its role in the strike, and the 
memorandum, which was written more than a year before Mr. Awlaki 
was killed, did not independently analyze the quality of the evidence 
against him. The Washington Post reported on the story several days 
earlier. See Peter Finn, In Secret Memo, Justice Department Sanctioned 
Strike, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2011, at A9. 
20. Savage, supra note 19. See Jordan J. Paust, Propriety of Self-Defense 
Targetings of Members of al Qaeda and Applicable Principles of 
Distinction and Proportionality, 18 ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 565, 574–
76 (2012) (arguing that the killing of al-Awlaki was legal); but see Mary 
Ellen O’Connell, The Right to Life in War and Peace: A Legal and 
Moral Critique of Targeted Killing, Remarks for the Institute of 
Theology and Peace (Hamburg) (Aug. 15, 2012), available at 
http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/sites/default/files/The%20Right%20to
%20Life%20in%20War%20and%20Peace.txt.  
21. Savage, supra note 19. 
22. Id. (although apparently this official could be prosecuted in Yemen for 
murder, according to the memo). 
23. Finn, supra note 19.  
24. Savage, supra note 19. 
25. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Speech at Northwestern 
University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051. html. 
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who to target for capture, who to target with lethal force, and who to 
try before military commissions as opposed to civilian courts.26 
Reading the speech, it is clear—if it hadn’t been before—that the 
precedents set and the tactics employed during the Bush 
Administration were not rejected by the Obama Administration, but 
in fact, have become part and parcel of U.S. policy. In fact, the 
fundamental conceptual error of the Bush Administration’s legal 
regime—that the targets of the U.S. “war on terror” are entitled to 
neither the protections of the criminal law (or human rights law), nor 
the protections of international humanitarian law, but exist instead in 
a legal “black hole” subject to the whim or the grace of the executive 
branch—remains virtually unchanged.27 Although generally avoiding 
the term “unlawful enemy combatant,” the Obama Administration 
appears in fact to be using the identical legal analysis as its 
predecessor.  
Finally, on April 30, 2012, the day after a particularly 
controversial drone strike in Pakistan, John O. Brennan, Assistant to 
the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, gave a 
spirited defense of Obama’s targeted killing policy at the Woodrow 
Wilson Center at Princeton University. Brennan is not a lawyer, but 
asserted that “the United States Government conducts targeted 
strikes against specific al-Qaida terrorists” in order to “prevent 
terrorist attacks on the United States” and to “save American lives.”28 
He also argued that the strikes were lawful “beyond hot battlefields 
like Afghanistan” and argued that they were legal, ethical and 
effective. Finally, he concluded that “we” (meaning the 
administration) employ standards and processes designed to ensure 
that targeting is legal and effective.  
Brennan’s speech, however, did not quell the international 
criticism of the U.S. drone program, however, nor satisfy Pakistani 
objections to its conduct. This is unsurprising, for other than Israel, 
the United States is the only country in the world to aggressively use 
targeted killing as part of its counterterrorism strategy.29 Two United 
26. Id. 
27. While other legal issues in the conduct of the drone wars are debatable, 
I have argued in earlier writings that this is not. See, e.g., Leila Nadya 
Sadat, A Presumption of Guilt: The Unlawful Enemy Combatant and 
the U.S. War on Terror, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL. 539 (2009). 
28. John O. Brennan, White House Counter Terrorism Adviser, Speech on 
U.S. Drone Strikes Targeted at al-Qaida at the Woodrow Wilson Center 
(Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/05/01/151778804 
/john-brennan-delivers-speech-on-drone-ethics. 
29. Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, ¶¶ 
13–26 (May 28, 2010). Russia has also reportedly used targeted killings 
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Nations Special Rapporteurs on Extra-judicial Executions, Philip 
Alston and Christophe Heyns, have criticized the drone program,30 
and ICRC President, Jacob Kellenberger, has worried aloud that it is 
undermining fundamental principles of international humanitarian 
law.31 More recently, on October 25, 2012, the United Nations 
announced the opening of an investigation into the “extrajudicial 
killings of suspected insurgents and the innocent civilians all too often 
executed in the process.”32 
III. Some Preliminary Legal Questions Raised by the 
Use of Drones by the United States 
In spite of the fact that many top U.S. lawyers have justified the 
use of targeted killing by the United States, they have not answered 
all the questions surrounding the use of this controversial new weapon 
of war. Perhaps in response to the fury generated by the Bush 
Administration’s torture memos, which were either released or leaked 
to the press and then subjected to intense analysis and debate by 
other lawyers, the “lawyering up” of targeted killing by the Obama 
Administration has largely remained vague, policy-oriented, and 
secret. The speeches of both Koh and Holder are imprecise as to 
which targets are permissible, where attacks may take place and 
under what conditions, whether or not specific congressional 
authorization exists or is needed for the attacks, who is entitled to 
carry out the operations, the military or the CIA, and the expected 
purpose of the killings. They rest upon assumptions about the law of 
war that have been challenged by many scholars and UN bodies, 
including the assumption that the United States is entitled to attack 
non-state actors under Article 51 of the UN Charter as a response to 
terrorist activity,33 that the ensuing “war” follows the alleged 
in Chechnya, which its military refers to as a counter-terrorism 
operation. Id. ¶ 23. 
30. Id. ¶ 10; Owen Bowcott, Drone Strikes Threaten 50 Years of 
International Law, Says UN Rapporteur, THE GUARDIAN (UK), June 21, 
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/21/drone-strikes-inte 
rnational-law-un. 
31. Jakob Kellenberger, IHL and New Weapon Technologies, 34th Round 
Table on Current Issues of International Law (Sep. 9, 2011), available at 
http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/ihl-and-new-weapon-technologies. 
32. See, e.g., United Nations to Begin Investigating US Drone Strike 
Targeted Kills, RT.COM (Oct. 26, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://rt.com/ 
usa/news/us-drone-emmerson-un-256/.  
33. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. 
U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 135, 143–144 (2004) (and authorities cited). See 
also Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal 
Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 996 (201); 
Luigi Condorelli, Les attentats du 11 septembre et leurs suite: ou va le 
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terrorists wherever they may be found,34 and that the war has no 
temporal limitations.35Some have suggested that the Obama 
Administration has resorted to killing terror suspects to avoid legal 
problems surrounding their indefinite detention and trial.36 I do not 
know if this is true.  Yet, the picture emerging suggests that the 
Obama Administration, like the Bush Administration before it, has 
implicitly reversed the normal rules and burdens of proof that 
accompany the use of lethal force be state, obliging those targeted to 
prove their innocence or status as civilians, and adopted a 
“presumption of guilt” rather than innocence for terror suspects. As 
Claire Finkelstein has observed:  
Our current approach to targeted killing is betwixt and 
between. We treat targeted individuals as belligerents insofar as 
we regard them as legitimate targets by virtue of status, rather 
than action. But we treat them as subjects of law enforcement 
in that we resist according them the privileges that go along 
with the status of combatants, such as affording them the rights 
of P.O.W.s and recognize their equal right to kill in combat.37 
This raises at least five sets of legal questions regarding U.S. 
targeted killing operations: 
a)   Questions as to the legal regime justifying the government’s    
     use of lethal force; 
b)   Questions as to the permissible targets; 
c)   Questions regarding the processes used to create the “kill  
      list,” as it is called;  
d)   Questions as to whether drone strikes are lawful methods of    
     warfare; and  
e)   Questions regarding the intended purposes of the strikes. 
Finally, given that some uses of drones are clearly lawful, this 
essay will briefly explore the questions surrounding even lawful uses of 
these very controversial new weapons.  
  
droit international?, 105 REVUE GÉNÉRAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC 829 (2001).  
34. Sadat, supra note 33, at 142.  
35. Id. at 143–44. See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with 
Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009 (Notre Dame 
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43, 2010).  
36. Claire Finkelstein, Targeted Killing as Preemptive Action, in TARGETED 
KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 161 (Claire 
Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) [hereinafter 
TARGETED KILLINGS]. 
37. Id. 
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A. What Legal Regime Justifies the Use of Lethal Force Against 
Terrorists or Taliban Armed Forces 
The Authorization for the Use of Military Force Resolution 
(AUMF) adopted by Congress in 2001 states that the president is 
authorized to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against: 
[T]hose nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks 
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons.38  
This Resolution seems to limit the targets of America’s war on 
terror to those having a nexus to the September 11th attacks. But it 
would not, on its face, suggest that individuals having nothing to do 
with those attacks could still fall within the armed conflict authorized 
by Congress in 2001. Indeed, recently, even conservative 
commentators and Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney 
has suggested that the drone program may need to be reauthorized 
specifically by Congress under the Constitution and the War Powers 
Resolution.39  
The government’s current position, as stated by Koh, is that the 
United States is engaged in an armed conflict between itself and 
various individuals and organizations that gave a right to the United 
States to use “self-defense” against these individuals and 
organizations.40 Under this view, this right of “self-defense” allows the 
government to kill individuals alleged to be enemies of the United 
States even if those individuals are found in the territories of states 
with which the United States clearly is not at war. Even assuming 
that the individuals in question were combatants that can be targeted 
in war, an assumption that in many cases is highly questionable as 
some of the individuals targeted appear clearly to be civilians, the fact 
that most drone strikes are taking place in states “at peace” with the 
United States, suggests not only that the use of military force against 
individuals in those states may be ill-advised, but that they may be 
unlawful.41 Although the United States continues to maintain that 
38. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 170th Cong. § 
2 (2001) (enacted). 
39. Romney for President, An American Century: A Strategy to Secure 
America’s Enduring Interests and Ideals 40 (A Romney for President 
White Paper, Oct. 7, 2011).  
40. Koh, supra note 1. 
41. Mary Ellen O’Connell makes this point, noting that without a state of 
armed conflict, even killing with permission of the government, does not 
make the operation lawful. O’Connell, supra note 35, at 16 (noting that 
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there are no geographical constraints to the “war on terror,” which 
follows suspected terrorists wherever they may be, that position has 
not generally been accepted by most authorities, at least not as a rule 
of international law.42 To the extent that military weapons are 
targeting individuals in areas outside a theatre of war, their use 
amounts to a violation of international human rights law, not a 
proper application of international humanitarian law. Philip Alston 
has made this point several times43 as has Professor Mary Ellen 
O’Connell.44 Moreover, it may be observed that if taken without the 
consent of the territorial state against whom they are launched, U.S. 
drone strikes may amount to acts of aggression as well.  
It is possible to argue, as the United States does,45 that 
international human rights law is inapplicable to its extraterritorial 
activity, meaning that apparently no international norms specifically 
protect the right to life of individuals residing outside the United 
States in countries with which the United States is at peace, other 
than the domestic law of the countries in which the individuals are 
targeted. International human rights bodies and international courts 
and tribunals have, for the most part, rejected this assertion.46 Yet 
the strikes may violate the international human rights obligations of 
those governments permitting (or acquiescing to) U.S. targeted killing 
activities on their territories.  
Moreover, the U.S. position also suggests that there are no 
temporal constraints on self-defense, which may continue ad infinitum 
after a terror attack—or at least one on the scale of the September 
11th attacks—and continues to refer to Resolution 1373 as 
authorizing drone strikes taking place eleven years later. Professor 
even “express consent” from Pakistan would not justify the use of 
drones by the United States on Pakistani territory given the absence of 
an armed conflict for most of the period that the United States has been 
using drones there). 
42. Id. at 23–24; but see Paust, supra note 20, at 573 (arguing that although 
the United States cannot be “at war” with al-Qaeda, it can use military 
force in self-defense against al-Qaeda members anywhere in the world).  
43. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 29, ¶ 22. 
44. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 
4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y J. 343, 355 (2010). 
45. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Third Periodic Reports 
of States Parties Due in 2003: United States of America, ¶ 130, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005). 
46. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, ¶ 25, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (the protection of the ICCPR 
does not cease in times of war, and in principle the right not arbitrarily 
to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities, but is evaluated 
under international humanitarian law). 
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Monica Hakimi has recently suggested that the legal problems caused 
by U.S. targeted-killing policies stem from the effort to place them in 
either the “domain” of international human rights law or international 
humanitarian law, and proposes a balancing test that would be used 
in all cases.47 Yet her work, like the administration’s approach, takes 
as its starting point the necessity and appropriateness of targeted 
killing of individuals living outside the United States as a remedy to 
U.S. insecurity about future terrorist attacks. This is a “war” 
paradigm, which takes killing as a given, not a “peace” paradigm, 
which takes the protection of life as the most fundamental duty of the 
state. International law has traditionally taken a bright line rather 
than a balancing approach to certain jus cogens norms such as the 
prohibition of torture, and the protection of life, both of which are 
non-derogable norms under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.48  
B. Questions as to the Permissible Targets  
The rhetoric used to describe the individuals placed on the CIA’s 
“kill list” is imprecise. The individuals in question are alternatively 
described as “terrorists,”49 “suspected terrorists,” “Islamic radicals,” 
“insurgents,” “members of al-Qaeda and its associates,” “Taliban,” 
“jihadists,” “[M]uslim extremists,” and “unlawful combatants” 
depending upon the source consulted. None of these, with the possible 
exception of “members of al-Qaeda and its associates” have much 
legal consonance, nor are they particularly well-defined categories of 
individuals. Is a “suspected terrorist” a proper target? Is he or she a 
civilian? A combatant? What constitutes direct participation in 
hostilities? Who decides? The ICRC has issued guidelines that the 
UN Report on Extrajudicial Killings has criticized because it includes 
individuals who may be included because of their status, and not just 
their conduct.50 But it is not clear that the United States respects 
even the ICRC guidelines, as, for example, the United States appears 
to permit the targeted killing of drug traffickers whereas the ICRC 
guidelines do not.51 How sure must the CIA be of his or her 
membership in and active participation in al-Qaeda before he or she 
can be placed on the CIA’s kill list? How is it that the U.S. 
47. See Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting and 
Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365 (2012). 
48. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 6–7, G.A. 
Res. 2200(XXI)A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 
(XXI)A, (Dec. 16, 1966). 
49. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s 
Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1. 
50. Alston, supra note 29, ¶ 65. 
51. Id. ¶ 68. 
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government can now use lethal military force to kill a U.S. citizen 
with no judicial process in a foreign country far from any active 
theatre of war?  
In 2002, an American of Yemeni background, Kamal Derwish, 
was killed by a missile from a Predator Drone. Derwish was not the 
target of the attack, according to media reports, but the U.S. position 
was that “as an enemy combatant. . . . [he] had no constitutional 
rights.”52 Nonetheless, it shocked many and the killing was widely 
reported and denounced in the US media. Fewer than ten years later, 
government policy has been transformed from accidentally killing U.S. 
citizens to targeting them, with very little public explanation or 
justification. The kill lists target specific individuals, not just soldiers 
on a battlefield, and of course, no surrender is possible once a 
targeting decision has been taken.  
C. Questions Regarding the Processes Used to Create the “Kill List” 
It has been reported that President Obama himself oversees 
decisions to place terrorists on a “kill list,” looking at pictures and 
intelligence briefings and considering discussions with his advisors.53 
According to the published information available, each week the 
President and his advisors gather by teleconference to decide which 
individuals should be targeted and killed. President Obama himself 
reportedly must approve every name, signing off on every strike in 
Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan—including al-Awlaki—about one third 
of the total.54 Yet in Pakistan, the President had approved not only 
“personality” strikes, aimed at named individuals, but “signature” 
strikes that target alleged training camps and suspicious compounds 
in areas allegedly controlled by militants and individuals whose 
identities are unknown. Because signature strikes became so 
controversial, they were stopped in Pakistan, but the CIA had, 
according to the media, sought authority to carry them out in 
Yemen.55  
The process used by the executive branch to determine who and 
when to target human beings for death can be summarized in two 
words: “trust us.” They would undoubtedly add, “we are very 
careful.” I believe that a sincere effort to be careful has been 
undertaken by U.S. government officials, including the President 
himself; this is clear from both Holder’s and Brennan’s remarks, as 
52. John J. Lumpkin, Administration Says That Bush Has, in Effect: A 
License to Kill, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 2002, at A12. 
53. Becker & Shane, supra note 49.  
54. Id. 
55. Robert Naiman, Could We Stop ‘Signature’ Drone Strikes in Yemen 
and Pakistan?, HUFFINGTON POST WORLD (Apr. 27, 2012), www. 
huffingtonpost.com/robert-naiman/drones-yemen_b_1458668.html. 
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well as media accounts of President Obama’s personal engagement 
with targeting terrorists. Yet it is simply not consistent with the rule 
of law to make the lives of thousands of individuals depend solely on 
executive grace, or the wisdom and integrity of the person inhabiting 
the Oval Office in a particular year. Unsurprisingly, there have been 
mistakes reported, errors that resulted in families including women 
and children being killed by drone strikes. Some of these “mistakes” 
end up as YouTube videos of “children’s bodies and American missile 
parts,”56 which serve as recruitment devices for al-Qaeda and its 
associates, and fuel anti-American sentiment in areas where drones 
are operating.  
D. Questions as to Whether Drone Strikes Are Lawful Methods of 
Warfare 
States generally assume that unless a particular weapon is 
prohibited by treaty or a particular method of warfare has not been 
outlawed by treaty, it is lawful. Indeed, there is perhaps no area of 
international law more deeply dependent upon the application of the 
Lotus principle—which provides that restrictions on the sovereignty of 
states are not to be presumed57—than questions involving the use of 
weaponry by a state. Although states may concede the application of 
the principles of distinction and proportionality, as Koh has done with 
respect to drone attacks, they typically do not concede any 
limitations upon their choice of weaponry or means of warfare. 
Human rights groups, on the other hand, have often challenged 
particular weapons as violating the principles of distinction per se, or 
have challenged particular means of warfare as violating international 
law. During the NATO bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia, 
for example, human rights organizations and the government of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY,” the target of the campaign) 
argued that the NATO decision to wage a “zero-casualty war” caused 
NATO pilots to fly at “heights which enabled them to avoid attack 
by Yugoslav defenses and, consequently, made it impossible for them 
to properly distinguish between military or civilian objects on the 
ground.”58 When the ICTY Prosecutor rejected this assertion, a 
committee asked for an examination of the legality of NATO’s 
actions, stating:  
56. Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unman
ned_aerial_vehicles/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) 
57. The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 
at 18 (Sept. 7). 
58. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review 
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia ¶ 2 (1999) [hereinafter Final Report to the Prosecutor by 
the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign]. 
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The committee agrees there is nothing inherently unlawful 
about flying above the height which can be reached by enemy 
air defenses. However, NATO air commanders have a duty to 
take practicable measures to distinguish military objectives from 
civilians or civilian objectives. The 15,000 feet minimum 
altitude adopted for part of the campaign may have meant the 
target could not be verified with the naked eye. However, it 
appears that with the use of modern technology, the obligation 
to distinguish was effectively carried out in the vast majority of 
cases during the bombing campaign.59  
Today’s drone pilots, who are even further removed from their 
targets than NATO air commanders during the 1990s, may have even 
greater obligations under the laws of war to ensure that they are able 
to distinguish, with a degree of certainty, military from non-military 
targets. It is not clear, given the high levels of civilian casualties 
resulting from the drone strikes, that they are doing so. By way of 
comparison, the committee on the NATO bombing reported that the 
FRY (the targeted state) reported 495 civilians killed and 820 
civilians wounded60 in a bombing campaign that lasted for several 
months, and involved more than 38,000 sorties, 10,000 strike sorties, 
and the release of more than 23,000 air munitions.61 Yet, as noted 
earlier, America’s drone strikes in Pakistan alone from 2004 until 2012 
are estimated to have resulted in between 2,524–3,247 casualties, 
including 482–852 civilians, and an additional 1,204–1,330 injured,62 
from an estimated 350 strikes. While these figures are not 
uncontroverted, it would appear, if they are correct, that the ratio of 
civilians killed to air strikes undertaken is dramatically higher, by 
many orders of magnitude, in the case of the drone wars than the 
NATO intervention in 1999. While numbers alone do not tell the 
story, this seems much closer to the kind of reckless intent suggesting 
the offense of unlawful attack upon civilians that was alleged to have 
been violated by NATO in 1999.63  
E. Questions Regarding the Intended Purposes of the Strikes 
The purpose of the drone strikes depends upon the nature of the 
target and the areas being targeted. In Pakistan, for example, in 2009 
it was reported that only six of the forty-one CIA drone strikes 
59. Id. ¶ 55. 
60. Id. ¶ 90. 
61. Id. ¶ 54. 
62. Obama 2012 Pakistan Strikes, supra note 16; LIVING UNDER DRONES, 
supra note 16, at vi (reporting similar statistics).  
63. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review 
the NATO Bombing Campaign, supra note 58, ¶¶ 28–29. 
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conducted by the Obama Administration targeted members of al-
Qaeda. To obtain the cooperation of Pakistan for the drone program, 
Pakistani officials were permitted to nominate targets then “taken 
out” by U.S. drone strikes, and eighteen strikes were therefore 
directed at Taliban targets, fifteen of which were aimed at Baitullah 
Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban in Pakistan.64 Some strikes seem to 
target al-Qaeda leaders; others appear generally directed at the 
Taliban or other “suspected militants.” Some strikes are taking place 
during active military conflict in war zones, such as the U.S. drones 
flown in Libya in 2011, whereas others on the territories of states such 
as Yemen, with which the United States is not at war. In terms of the 
counter-terrorism use of drones, which are clearly the most 
controversial, there are several possible purposes for the strikes:  
–Specific deterrence (killing “terrorists” to punish them and so 
they cannot engage in future operations against the United 
States or its allies);  
–General deterrence (demonstrating U.S. ability to kill at great 
distances and thereby deterring other would-be “terrorists”); 
–Retribution (punishing those who are deemed morally 
blameworthy because they have “hurt” the United States or 
attacked U.S. interests, allies, or persons, or have allegedly 
allied themselves with persons who have done so); 
–Preventive or pre-emptive strikes to eliminate potential threats 
against the United States, U.S. interests, allies, or persons 
(combining specific and general deterrence). 
In this brief discussion, it is impossible to fully elaborate upon 
each of these categories but it is worth noting that several either 
violate principles of international humanitarian law (such as killing 
for retribution and preventive strikes) and others may do so as well. 
Given that experts have suggested that the number of high-value 
targets killed in Pakistan is as low as one in seven persons killed, one 
wonders whether the purpose is general deterrence or frightening the 
civilian population in areas of alleged terrorist activity to prevent 
civilians from possibly assisting alleged terrorists and disrupting their 
operations. Yet terrorizing a civilian population may be a war crime, 
as the ICTY found in the Galic case65 and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone has held as well.66 To the extent that the United States is 
64. Mayer, supra note 11. 
65. See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 5, 2003). 
66. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 
¶ 115 (Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter CDF Case]. 
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perceived as carrying out reprisals for the 9/11 attacks against 
Pakistanis who may not have had anything to do with them,67 the 
drone campaign is more suggestive of collective punishment than the 
surgically precise targeting of particularly dangerous individuals, 
which is how the U.S. government justifies it. Indeed, a recent study 
carried out by clinics at New York University and Stanford University 
law schools suggests that the presence of the drones “terrorizes men, 
women, and children, giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma 
among civilian communities.”68 Finally, a Pakistani professor at 
Lahore University has made the additional point that while it may be 
admitted that al-Qaeda has as its mission the carrying out of jihad 
against U.S. forces and persons wherever possible, the Taliban has as 
its goal to regain power in Afghanistan and re-institute its vision of a 
purist state.69 If this is correct, the drone campaign at best appears 
over inclusive, targeting the Taliban which is not fighting a global 
war against the United States but a local war for control of its 
territory, as well as targeting many low-level terrorism suspects and 
civilians.  
IV. Ethical and Moral Questions Raised by U.S. 
Targeted Killing Operations 
This essay has argued that the legal framework within which U.S. 
drone strikes are carried out as part of the “war on terror” is shaky, 
especially outside of active war zones. Indeed, it rests  upon 
assumptions about international humanitarian law that are highly 
contested. At the same time, it is certainly correct that some drone 
strikes are legal under more traditional notions of international 
humanitarian law than those the U.S. government currently seems to 
employ. Yet, as this essay has already noted, international 
humanitarian law rules do not address the question whether the use of 
drones by the United States is effective, nor whether it is morally 
justified or represents U.S. values.  
As Whitney R. Harris wrote, some years before his death,  
[T]he rule of law of Nuremberg, and of modern Rome [meaning 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court] is 
universal, binding large states and small, victor and vanquished 
in any future war. The principle was most forcefully expressed 
by Mr. Justice Jackson when he declared that international law 
67. Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation 
Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 
9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 77, 87 (2010). 
68. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 16, at vii.  
69. Id. at 17–18. 
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condemned aggression by every nation, “including those which 
sit here now in judgment.”70  
This idea has been captured by Jeremy Waldron’s work requiring 
legal norms to be neutral in their application and has particular 
salience for the use of drones and targeted killing as tactics of war. 
The United States now conducts its targeted killing campaign as if 
only states with “good” purposes (like us) will have access to or 
deploy these weapons. Waldron notes that if we defend as legal (and 
appropriate) a norm (N1) such as, “named civilians may be targeted 
with deadly force if they are presently involved in planning terrorist 
atrocities or are likely to be involved in carrying them out in the 
future,”71 because international humanitarian law applies to all states 
alike, we must expect N1 to be used by other states, including 
enemies of the United States. Moreover, given American disinclination 
to permit international, or even domestic scrutiny, of its targeted 
killing operations, the United States cannot expect other countries to 
do much better, especially countries we might expect to use targeted 
killing, and drones if they had them, unscrupulously. The notion that 
the “good guys” get to use different rules than the “bad guys” has 
periodically surfaced in both moral analysis72 and at the international 
criminal tribunals. Recall the arguments made and initially accepted 
in the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) case at the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone that, as the opponents of the Revolutionary United Front, the 
CDF were operating under different principles.73 Yet those arguments 
have been overwhelmingly rejected by the nations of the world in the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. By its terms, Rome Law 
applies to all nations, small or large, rich or poor;74 with, 
unfortunately a possible escape hatch for the Permanent Members of 
the Security Council and countries under their protection. It is 
estimated that over seventy other countries, including China, Russia, 
Pakistan, and Iran, now possess drone technology.75 Current U.S. 
policy on drones appears to be providing other countries with 
unintended incentives to both develop and use these weapons.  
70. WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL 560 (1995). 
71. Jeremy Waldron, Justifying Targeted Killing with a Neutral Principle, 
in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 3636, at 112. 
72. Particularly in the work of philosophy professor Jeff McMahan. 
73. See CDF Case, supra note 66. 
74. Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, art. 27, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
75. Mapping Drone Proliferation: UAVs in 76 Countries, GLOBAL RES. 
(Sep. 18, 2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/mapping-drone-prolifera 
tion-uavs-in-76-countries/5305191.  
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Finally, as Peter Singer recently noted, specific uses of drones in 
war may not only violate international humanitarian law, but they 
represent a technology that appears to remove the last political 
barrier to war. The drone campaign involves hundreds of strikes and 
thousands of deaths, and yet it has never been seriously debated or 
authorized by Congress. Moreover, it has spread to additional 
countries and campaigns: nearly 150 American unmanned systems 
were deployed over Libya, without approval by Congress.76 When 
asked why there was no need to comply with the War Powers 
Resolution to obtain additional authorization for the use of force, the 
White House argued that the operations did not “involve the presence 
of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof.”77 As 
Singer notes, however, “they did involve something we used to think 
of as war: blowing up stuff, lots of it.”78  
Drones are fired from thousands of miles away, using technology 
that resembles a video game. After the killing is over, the drone 
operator returns home to a “normal” life—perhaps grabbing a bite to 
eat, hugging his kids, or enjoying time with friends. Some uses of 
drones may be clearly legal under the principles of the laws of war; 
but their misuse and overuse as counterterrorism tools raise real legal 
and moral problems. While the occasional or exceptional use of drone 
strikes to target very dangerous individuals that cannot be captured 
might be tolerable, the widespread use of these controversial weapons 
by the United States is deeply problematic. As we saw with the 
practice of torture by the United States following the 9/11 attacks, 
the exception easily becomes the rule, and those opposing the use of 
targeted killing find themselves trying to justify why a particular 
individual should not be killed, rather than the government being 
required to show not only why it is legal for the killing to take place, 
but that capture is impossible.79 
For several months I have had a newspaper clipping on the corner 
of my desk about the death of a young man named Tariq Aziz who 
was killed in Pakistan by a Hellfire missile strike launched by the 
United States. Tariq’s story emerged from the shadows of the CIA’s 
76. Peter Singer, Do Drones Undermine Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2012, at SR5.  
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. In this essay, I do not focus on the requirement that a government must 
claim that capture is not feasible. Indeed, under the laws of war, 
individuals who surrender must be captured rather than killed. Because 
it impossible to surrender to a drone, that rule is, by definition, difficult 
to apply in the context of targeted killing with aerial unmanned 
vehicles. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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drone war only because he had encountered a lawyer, Clive Smith, at 
a meeting organized to discuss the drone strikes held between 
Westerners and Pashtun tribal leaders a few days before his death. 
Tariq was brought to the meeting to experience the interaction with 
Americans, and, according to Smith, was friendly, open, and warm—
”too young for much facial hair; too young to have learned to hate.”80 
For some reason, he was targeted for death, and killed by a Hellfire 
missile fired from a Predator while driving a car with his twelve-year 
old cousin—who was also killed—on the way to pick up his aunt and 
bring her home to his village.81 As Smith wrote in The New York 
Times: 
My mistake had been to see the drone war in Waziristan in 
terms of abstract legal theory—as a blatantly illegal invasion of 
Pakistan’s sovereignty, akin to President Richard M. Nixon’s 
bombing of Cambodia in 1970. 
But now the issue has suddenly become very real and personal. 
Tariq was a good kid, and courageous. My warm hand recently 
touched his in friendship; yet, within three days, his would be 
cold in death, the rigor mortis inflicted by my government.  
And Tariq’s extended family, so recently hoping to be our allies 
for peace, has now been ripped apart by an American missile—
most likely making any effort we make at reconciliation futile.82  
Tariq’s story reminds us that war and international humanitarian 
law are not just abstract legal and political concepts, but deeply 
personal realities for the human beings caught in their throes. His 
story could have been our story, had we been unlucky enough to live 
in a different time or place. In assessing the legality, morality, and 
policy considerations surrounding America’s targeting killing policy, 
that is a sobering thought indeed.  
 
80. Clive Stafford Smith, For Our Allies, Death from Above, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2011, at A31. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
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